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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 20001063-CA 
v. : 
DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for Workers Compensation Insurance Fraud, a 
second degree felony, and attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly order restitution where the crime to which 
defendant pleaded guilty caused WCF to pay for medication it would 
not have otherwise paid for? 
"An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order "unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion/" State v. Breeze. 
2001 UT App 200, ^ 5, 29 P.3d 19 (citations omitted). However, if the claim involves a 
question of statutory interpretation, this Court "reviewfs] the trial court's interpretation 
of a statute for correctness and accord[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State 
v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
II. Did the trial court commit plain error in relying on unchallenged 
hearsay contained in defendant's PSI where Utah courts have 
universally assumed PSIs are reliable? 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred; (2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) she would have obtained a more 
favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
III. Does evidence that defendant's conduct caused WCF to pay for 
medication it would not have otherwise paid for support the trial 
court's restitution order? 
'To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence [supporting a restitution 
order], appellant 'must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the] evidence contradicts the 
trial court's verdict.'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)). 
IV. Did the trial court err in failing to make specific findings on the PSI 
issues explicitly raised in defendant's brief where the first issue did not 
involve the PSI and the court addressed the second? 
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty is a question of law 
that we review for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 P.3d 1133. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with one count of Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Fraud, one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance [Oxycontin] 
with intent to distribute, and two counts of obtaining a controlled substance [Oxycontin] 
by fraud (R. 3-4). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to the first 
count as charged and to an amended second count charging attempted distribution of 
methamphetamine; the State agreed to dismiss the other charges (R. 38; R. 90:2-3, 12). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of one to fifteen years on the 
fraud conviction and zero to five years on the distribution conviction (R. 91). The court 
then suspended the sentences and ordered defendant to serve 60 days in jail, complete 48 
months of probation, and pay restitution in the amount of S 14,647 (R. 92-93). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 64). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In 1991, defendant injured her back while working at Olsen's Greenhouse Gardens 
(R. 5; R. 61:2). In 1994, as a result of this injury, defendant represented to the Utah 
Industrial Commission that she was permanently totally disabled (R. 5; R. 61:2). 
Worker's Compensation Fund ("WCF") agreed to continue to pay any medical expenses 
resulting from the injury (R. 5; R. 61:2). As part of this agreement, WCF paid 
defendant's bills for prescription drugs, totaling $16,152.41 (R. 5; R. 61:2). The bulk of 
these bills ($14,647) was attributable to Oxycontin, an opiate pain reliever and controlled 
substance ((R. 5; R. 61:2; R. 77:18). 
While receiving benefits from WCF because of her permanent total disability, 
defendant began working 25 to 30 hours a week in a cafeteria at Salt Lake Community 
College under the assumed name of Deborah Lee Hardy (R. 5, 39; R. 61:2-3; R. 90:7). 
Her responsibilities included "lifting 20 pound buckets of ice at least twice a day, four to 
six hours of standing as a cashier, and cooking" (R. 61:3). Her supervisor reported that 
defendant did not appear to have any difficulty performing her duties (R. 61:3). 
Defendant did not report her employment to her treating physician, Dr. Dall, or her WCF 
claims adjuster (Id.). 
'Because defendant pleaded guilty to the charges before a preliminary hearing 
was held, the facts are taken from the probable cause statement supporting the 
information, the plea hearing, and defendant's presentence investigation report. 
4 
Despite her new employment, defendant continued to receive Oxycontin. 
Defendant represented to Dr. Dall that her back pain was so severe that she "was unable 
to function without continuous pain medication1' (R. 61:3). According to defendant's 
PSI, WCF would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it had known she was 
employed (R. 61:4; R. 77:9-10). Dr. Dall concurred that if defendant had been truthful, 
he would not have prescribed Oxycontin (R. 61:3-4). 
On September 5, 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to Worker's Compensation 
Insurance Fraud and Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine (R. 38; R. 90:2-3, 12). 
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss two other counts that charged 
defendant with obtaining a controlled substance, Oxycontin, by fraud (R. 4, 38). 
At sentencing, the State conceded that WCF was required to pay for some 
medication for defendant (R. 77:9). However, the State argued that defendant should pay 
restitution for the difference in cost between the Oxycontin and methadone, a cheaper 
drug often prescribed as an Oxycontin substitute (R. 77:8-11). When defendant objected 
to methadone as the substitute, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the 
full amount of the Oxycontin prescribed, $14,647 (R. 92). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Under Utah's restitution statute, a trial court must impose restitution for 
any damages resulting from a defendant's criminal conduct. Here, defendant admitted 
that she intentionally obtained benefits from WCF under false pretenses by working 
5 
under an assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemplovable. Because one 
of those benefits was payment for medication WCF would not have paid for if it had 
known defendant was working, the trial court properly ordered restitution in this case. 
II. To succeed on her unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly relied 
on double and triple hearsay contained in her PSI, defendant must show that an error 
occurred, that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error 
harmed her. Defendant cannot do that here. Because the preparer of a PSI inevitably 
relies on third parties for information, a PSI always contains at least double hearsay. 
Yet, Utah case law has consistently held that a trial court may properly consider 
information contained in a PSI report so long as defendant is given the opportunity to 
challenge that information at sentencing. Indeed, State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 
1993)—the case on which defendant's claim heavily rests—relies on information in a 
PSI. Thus, defendant cannot demonstrate that any error, let alone plain error, occurred. 
III. Evidence that WCF would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it 
had known she was well enough to work supports the trial court's restitution order. 
Thus, defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim fails. 
IV. Utah courts are entitled to have the issues clearly defined on appeal. Here, 
defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to address objections to her PSI on 
the record. However, in support of her claim, defendant makes several conclusory 
statements which, neither alone nor in conjunction with the record cites she supplies, 
6 
adequateK identity the alleged objections she now claims should have been addressed. 
Because this part of her claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should refuse to 
consider it. Concerning the two issues defendant does adequately identify in her brief. 
both fail on the merits. The first issue, which addresses evidence outside of the PSI 
more than evidence inside it, was not raised clearly enough below to alert the trial court 
that action was warranted. The second issue was addressed by the trial court on the 
record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED RESTITUTION 
WHERE THE CRIME TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLEADED 
GUILTY CAUSED WCF PECUNIARY DAMAGES 
Defendant claims that the "sentencing court misapplied the restitution statute" by 
imposing restitution for conduct for which she "was not convicted, did not plead guilty, 
and did not admit responsibility." Aplt. Br. at 12. Specifically, defendant claims that 
restitution for the cost of Oxycontin was improper because "the only charges that were 
related to Oxycontin were dismissed in exchange for her guilty plea." Aplt. Br. at 16. 
Defendant's claim is without merit. 
This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless it exceeds that 
prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion/" State v. Breeze. 2001 UT App 
200, •} 5. 29 P.3d 19 (citations omitted). However, when the claim involves a question 
of statutory interpretation, this Court "reviewfs] the trial court's interpretation of a 
7 
statute for correctness and accord[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. 
Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of 
crime as provided in this subsection." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). "Criminal 
activities" is defined in section 76-3-201(1 )(b) as "any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court." Id. § 76-3-201(l)(b); see also State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 
f 3, 987 P.2d 1289. Under this section, if "it is clear that but for [defendant's admitted] 
criminal act," the victim's loss would not have occurred, the court must order defendant 
to make restitution to that victim. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App. 1997) 
Here, defendant pleaded guilty to "obtaining] workers compensation benefits by 
working under an assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemployable" (R. 
39; Addendum B). Although defendant never admitted that WCF's payment for her 
Oxycontin medication was one of those benefits, the record clearly establishes that it 
was. Cf. McBride. 940 P.2d at 544 (holding defendant convicted of joyriding was 
properly ordered to pay restitution to owner where car was impounded and then, due to 
police oversight, subsequently sold). According to defendant's PSI, WCF would not 
have paid for defendant's Oxycontin "had they known of defendant["s] gainful 
employment under the assumed name" (R. 61:4; Addendum B). The PSI also indicated 
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that, **[o]n March 1, 1999, Dr. Dall told WCF investigator McDonald that if he had 
known that defendant. . . was gainfully employed under an alias. . . . he would not have 
prescribed Oxycontin for [her]v (R. 61:3-4; Addendum C D). Finally, a status report 
from Dr. Dall dated May 31, 2000 indicated that, because "narcotic medications [like 
Oxycontin] have been disallowed for this lady" due to her criminal conduct. Dr. Dall did 
in fact—as the PSI suggested he would—stop prescribing defendant Oxycontin (R. 50: 
Addendum D). 
This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings that defendant 
"would not have received Oxycontin at all had she been forthright and had she been not 
engaging in her fraudulent activities'* (R. 77:16: Addendum E). Therefore, the trial 
court properly ordered defendant to pay restitution "for the medication she never should 
have obtained but for her lying, conniving, cheating conduct" (R. 77:17; Addendum E). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4); McBride. 940 P.2d at 544 (holding that restitution is 
properly ordered where "it is clear that but for [defendant's] criminal act," the damages 
would not have occurred). 
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289, on which defendant relies, see 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15., is inapposite. In Watson, the defendant was originally charged with 
criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, and obstruction of justice because she 
allegedly drove co-defendants to and from a scene where the co-defendants killed one 
person and injured another, and then she sold the car in which she had driven them. 
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Watson. 1999 UT App 273, at <| 2. The murder and attempted murder charges against 
Watson were subsequently dismissed when she agreed to plead guilty to attempted 
obstruction of justice. Id. Despite never accepting responsibility for the other crimes or 
otherwise agreeing to pay restitution for them, defendant was nonetheless ordered to pay 
restitution for damages relating to the murder. Id. at If 4. This Court held that such a 
restitution order was improper under section 76-3-201. Id. at 1} 6. 
In contrast to Watson, defendant here pleaded guilty to the exact conduct that 
caused WCF pecuniary damages. Specifically, defendant admitted to "obtaining] 
workers compensation benefits by working under an assumed name while receiving 
benefits for being unemployable" (R. 39; Addendum B). One of those benefits was 
WCFs payment for Oxycontin (R. 5; R. 61:3-4; R. 77:9-10). Because the trial court 
here only ordered defendant to pay restitution for the pecuniary damages specifically 
caused by her admitted conduct, Watson does not apply. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
RELYING ON UNCHALLENGED HEARSAY IN DEFENDANT'S 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Defendant claims that the "sentencing court erred and violated [her] due process 
rights when it relied almost exclusively upon double and triple hearsay in determining 
the amount of restitution." Aplt. Br. at 19. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial 
court improperly relied on the presentence investigation report, "which is itself hearsay. 
10 
contains statements made by the WCF imestigation both those made b> himself, which 
amount to double hearsay, and those made by Dr. Dall to the WCF investigator, which 
are triple hearsay." Aplt. Br. at 20. 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, she asks this Court to review it 
for plain error. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error 
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant 
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
Here, defendant claims the trial court committed plain error under State v. 
Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993). because it relied on the PSI that contained double 
and triple hearsay. According to defendant, Johnson held that such hearsay is 
necessarily unreliable and that a trial court therefore always errs in relying on such 
hearsay at sentencing. Such a reading of Johnson, however, would necessarily render 
consideration of any PSI at sentencing plain error. Johnson does not reach that far. 
A. The general rule is that PSI's, although at least double hearsay, 
are admissible at sentencing. 
'"The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
''requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quoting State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064. 1071 (Utah 1993) (quoting State 
v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985))): see also State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853. 854 
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(Utah 1994). At the same time, however, because the objective at sentencing is to 
determine the most appropriate penalty for each individual defendant, a sentencing court 
""must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably may bear on the 
proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed/" State v. 
Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wasman v. United States. 468 U.S. 
559. 563 (1984)); see also Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
To balance these potentially competing principles, courts have concluded that 
'"the rules of evidence in general, and the rules on hearsay exceptions in particular, are 
inapplicable in sentencing proceedings/' Sanwick. 713 P.2d at 709; see also State v. 
McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1997); Utah R. Evid. 1101 (providing that rules 
of evidence do not apply at sentencing). However, due process and ^fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the right to 
examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon 
which [his or her] sentence is based/" Patience, 944 P.2d at 389 (quoting State v. 
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994)). Accordingly, ~[h]earsay [is] admissible as 
long as the defendant [has] the opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence and to 
challenge the reliability of the evidence presented/' Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 709; Patience. 
944P.2dat389. 
Consistent with these rules, Utah law provides that prior to imposing sentence, 
"the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for [sentencing] 
12 
for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report." Id. § 77-18-1(5) (1999). 
This report is provided to "assist the courts in sentencing." id. § 64-13-20( l)(a)(k). and 
shall include consideration "of the social, physical, and mental conditions and 
backgrounds of offenders," id. § 64-13-20(10(a)(i), (1 )(c)(i). It "shall" also include "a 
victim impact statement" and "a specific statement of pecuniary damages." Id. § 77-18-
1(5). A copy of the report must then be provided to defendant or her counsel at least 
three working days before sentencing. Id. § 77-18-1(6). 
As defendant's PSI exemplifies, the majority of the information contained in a 
PSI is gathered from third party sources. See, e.g., R. 61 (noting sources as "Court 
dockets and District Attorney file"; "The defendant": "Contact with Larry McDonald of 
the WCF"; "Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail": "Utah State 
Juvenile Court records": "Contact with Eric Anderson of the United States Probation 
Office": "Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records"); Addendum C. 
Thus. "*[b]y the very nature of a presentence investigation report, it is necessary 
to rely to a great extent upon hearsay information/" State v. Ritsch, 440 N.W.2d 689, 
691 (Neb. 1989)(citation omitted); see also State v. Sims. 887 P.2d 72, 80 (Kan. 1994) 
("Information required to be included in a presentence investigation report necessarily 
includes hearsay/'). 
Nonetheless, "[ujnder the practice of individualizing punishments, investigation 
techniques have been given an important role." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
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249 (1949). Thus, presentence investigation reports have become "a valuable 
sentencing aid/" Williams v. State. 601 So. 2d 1062, 1085 (Ala. Crim. Ct. 1992) 
(citation omitted), affd without opinion. 662 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1992). and the probation 
officers who prepare them, "a valuable resource to judges/" State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 
853, 855 (Utah 1994). "To deprive sentencing judges of [the] kind of information 
[contained in such reports] would undermine modern penological procedural policies 
that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and 
experimentation/' Williams. 337 U.S. at 249-50. Moreover. "[t]he type and extent of 
this information make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with 
cross-examination/* Id. at 250. Such considerations "admonish [this Court] against 
treating the due-process clause as a uniform command that courts throughout the Nation 
abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to 
guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence." Williams, 337 U.S. 
at 250: see also State v. Sims, 887 P.2d 72, 80 (Kan. 1994) (holding strict application of 
evidentiary rules at sentencing "would deprive the court of the information necessary to 
fulfill its responsibilities"). 
Consequently, Utah courts have consistently held that, unless "the accuracy of a 
report is contested," "we must presume that reports prepared by professional probation 
officers . . . are generally reliable/' Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977). See 
State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994) (rejecting defendant's due process claim 
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where defendant was provided copy of PSI before sentencing, had an opportunity to 
examine the report and challenge its contents, and failed to avail himself of that 
opportunity): State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115. 118 (Utah 1985) (holding defendant must 
be supplied copy of presentence report to effectuate requirement that judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in fixing sentence); State v. Anderson. 632 
P.2d 877. 878-79 (Utah 1981) (holding court did not err in considering information in 
PSI where it "[was] disclosed to the defendant who made no objection"); State v. Lipsky. 
608 P.2d 1241. 1242 (Utah 1980) (holding "trial court may receive information 
concerning the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report" as long as report is 
"disclosed to the defendant" and he has "the opportunity to bring . . . inaccuracies to the 
court's attention"); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1991) (holding 
defendant's due process rights are protected where defendant receives presentence 
report in time to effectively contest any perceived inaccuracies). 
B. Johnson does not alter this rule. 
In State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), Johnson, after being convicted 
for various sex crimes involving the same child, challenged the trial court's reliance at 
sentencing on hearsay evidence that he had abused another victim. Johnson claimed that 
the evidence—which was not contained in a PSI but, rather, in a sexual abuse center's 
report and various other documents—was unreliable double and triple hearsay and that 
the trial court therefore violated his due process rights by relying on it. Id. at 1070-71. 
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After reciting the above stated principles, the supreme court agreed with Johnson. 
Because "[n]ot only did the report consist almost entirely of double and triple hearsay, 
but also the hearsay statements contained numerous internal inconsistencies and 
speculative conclusions based on incomplete information and questionable factual 
assumptions," the trial court erred in relying thereon. Id. at 1071-72. 
Although it is true, as defendant notes, that Johnson states at one point that 
"double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for 
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing," Johnson, at 1071. that 
statement has never been literally applied, especially to PSIs. As noted above, cases 
both before and after Johnson assume that, absent a defendant's specific objection, PSIs 
are reliable. See State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, If 34, 999 P.2d 7 (holding trial court has 
duty to resolve alleged inaccuracies where defendant "objected to the presentence report 
prepared in this case"): State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, «flf 42~45> 9 7 3 p - 2 d 4 0 4 (same); 
Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855; Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Anderson. 632 P.2d at 878-79; Lipsky. 
608 P.2d at 1242; Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1050-51. 
Moreover, Johnson itself relies on information in the defendant's PSI in support 
of his appeal. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1073, 1074. In addition, it cites approvingly to 
Lipsky, see Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1073, which expressly held that a "trial court may 
receive information concerning the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report" so 
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long as the report is "disclosed to the defendant" and he has "the opportunity to bring . . 
. inaccuracies to the court's attention." Lipsky\ 608 P.2d at 878-79. 
Thus, a reasonable interpretation of Johnson is that a trial court cannot rely on 
double or triple hearsay at sentencing where the defendant expressly challenges that 
hearsay and the hearsay on its face lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. See Johnson. 
856 P.2d at 1072-73; State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997) (describing 
Johnson as holding that "report trial court relied on was inherently unreliable because it 
consisted of double and triple hearsay and 'contained numerous internal consistencies 
and speculative conclusions based on incomplete information and questionable factual 
assumptions'"); State ex rel W.S.. 939 P.2d 196, 201 (Utah App. 1997) (applying 
Johnson to parental termination case where "appellant objected repeatedly" to 
admission of pre-disposition report "because the caseworker . . . had no personal 
knowledge of the CPS investigations cited in the report" and where trial court did not 
allow appellant to testify "to rebut incidents cited in the pre-disposition report''). Absent 
objection, then, a trial court does not err under Johnson in assuming that a PSI is 
reliable.2 
2The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631 
(9th Cir. 1971), cited by defendant and relied upon in Johnson, lends further support for 
this interpretation. In Weston, defendant "vigorously denied the accuracy of [other 
charges in the PSI] and objected to the judge's consideration of them without more 
substantiation of them than appeared in the probation report." Because "the other 
criminal conduct charged was very serious, and the factual basis for believing the charge 
was almost nil," the Ninth Circuit agreed that the trial court erred in considering the 
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C. Because no established appellate law renders PSIs inadmissible at 
sentencing, defendant's plain error claim fails. 
As stated above, to show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error 
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant 
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). However, an error is not obvious "where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross* 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 
1997) (citing State v. Eldredge* 113 P.2d 29. 35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Br aim, 787 
P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Here, defendant cannot establish that any error, let alone obvious error, occurred 
in the trial court's reliance on unchallenged hearsay in her PSI. Johnson—the major 
case on which defendant relies—not only cites to information in defendant's PSI to 
support his appeal but also cites approvingly to a case that specifically held PSIs are 
admissible as long as they are subject to the defendant's challenge. See Johnson* 856 
P.2d at 1071 (citing Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)); Id. at 1073-74 (citing PSI). 
challenged evidence. Id. at 633. 
Since then, however, the Ninth Circuit has determined that "Weston was decided 
under unique circumstances . . . because of the inherent difficulty for the defendant to 
prove or disprove the [charges] made against her in the presentence report." United 
States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1267 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, Weston has been interpreted 
to hold only "that when allegations included in a presentence report are not within the 
defendant's power to meaningfully refute and are based on only the barest factual 
foundation, then the district judge cannot in fairness consider them." Id.\ Charlesworth* 
217 F.3d at 1160-61; United States v. Branco* 798 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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In addition, all other Utah case law follows Lipskyrs rule. See, e.g., KohL 2000 UT 35. 
at«[ 34: Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, at «fl[ 42-45: Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855: HowelL 707 P.2d at 
118: Anderson. 632 P.2d at 878-79: Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1050-51. 
Consequently, defendant has not established that the trial court committed error. 
let alone plain error, in relying on unchallenged information in her PSI. Thus, 
defendant's plain error claim fails. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER WAS PROPER 
WHERE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CAUSED WCF TO PAY FOR 
MEDICATION IT WOULD NOT HAVE OTHERWISE PAID FOR 
Defendant claims that the evidence, "fully marshaled and regarded in the light 
most favorable to the sentencing court's determination, does not establish either that 
[her] admitted criminal acts were the 'but for' cause of pecuniary damages or that 
Methadone was a proper medication in lieu of Oxycontin." Aplt. Br. at 22. 
A trial court's factual findings will be reversed only if they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. State ex rel. LM9 2001 UT App 314,1j 14, 433 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6; State v. Andreason. 2001 UT App 395, f 4 n. 3, Utah Adv. Rep. . 
A. The evidence supports a "but for" connection between 
defendant's admitted conduct and WCF's pecuniary damages. 
Defendant claims that the evidence "does not establish . . . that [her] admitted 
criminal acts were the 'but for' cause of pecuniary damages." Aplt. Br. at 22. See State 
v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that restitution is proper 
where loss would not have occurred but for defendant's criminal conduct). 
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In support of her argument, defendant marshals evidence (1) that Dr. Dall 
originally prescribed Oxycontin for defendant and that WCF originally paid for 
Oxycontin as part of defendant's permanent total disability benefits; (2) that during this 
same time, defendant worked part-time at a community college cafeteria under an 
assumed name; and (3) that, according to defendant's PSL Dr. Dall would not have 
prescribed Oxycontin for defendant and WCF would not have paid for Oxycontin for 
defendant if they had known that she was employed. Aplt. Br. at 24. 
Defendant then claims that this evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's 
"but for" finding because it is "directly contradicted by reliable evidence" (1) that 
defendant "was entitled to receive medical benefits regardless of any misconduct" and 
that "Oxycontin had been determined to be the appropriate medication," Aplt. Br. at 24-
25. and (2) that "Dr. Dall would have continued to prescribe Oxycontin even had he 
known of [her] admitted misconduct of working under an assumed name." Aplt. Br. at 
25. Neither of defendant's contentions survives scrutiny. 
First, defendant does not show why her entitlement to receive medical benefits 
regardless of any misconduct necessarily equates to an entitlement to the specific 
narcotic Oxycontin. The fact that Dr. Dall prescribed Oxycontin for defendant after she 
fraudulently represented to him that "she was unable to function without continuous 
pain medication" (R. 61:3), does not establish such entitlement. As the trial court 
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appropriately noted. "Too bad she wasn't honest enough to [] get the best prescription 
medication he could have given" (R. 77:19; Addendum E). 
Second, defendant cannot show that "Dr. Dall would have continued to prescribe 
Oxycontin even had he known of [defendant's] admitted misconduct of working under 
an assumed name." Aplt. Br. at 25. In making that assertion, defendant relies on notes 
from Dr. Dall dated May 16, 2000 responding to WCFs statement that it would no 
longer pay for Oxycontin. Aplt. Br. at 35-36. In those notes. Dr. Dall states that "it is 
my medical responsibility to provide appropriate treatment regardless of allegations 
until those allegations are proven" and that if "indeed, [defendant] has been abusing my 
prescriptions in terms of forging, selling, etc., then that would be a felony and I would 
provide no further medication but would agree with the recommendation for drug detox" 
(R. 48-49; Addendum D). Defendant claims that these notes show Dr. Dall would have 
stopped prescribing Oxycontin "only if [defendant] 'has been abusing [his] prescriptions 
in terms of forging, selling, etc/" Aplt. Br. at 25-26 (citing R. 48-49). 
However, the doctor's notes do no such thing. Rather, they only indicate that Dr. 
Dall would continue prescribing a medication until the allegations were proven, not that 
he would necessarily continue prescribing Oxycontin. Indeed, Dr. DalPs willingness to 
prescribe something other than Oxycontin is made clear on the very next page of the 
record—Dr. Dall's notes dated May 31, 2000, in which he writes that "there is enough 
evidence against her that prescribing controlled substances for this lady is not 
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appropriate/* that defendant "understands my inability to prescribe controlled 
substances," that WCF "has indicated [it] will pay for nonnarcotic medications/* and 
that he has thus "written a prescription for that today" (R. 50: Addendum D). 
Thus, the evidence before the trial court at sentencing established (1) that WCF 
would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it had known she was working; 
(2) that Dr. Dall told WCF he would not have prescribed the Oxycontin if he had known 
defendant was working; and (3) that, in light of defendant's conduct and WCF's 
unwillingness to continue paying for Oxycontin, Dr. Dall stopped prescribing defendant 
Oxycontin (R. 50; R. 61:3-4). This evidence was sufficient to establish that "but for"* 
defendant's working under an assumed name and concealing her employment from 
WCF, WCF would not have paid for and Dr. Dall would not have prescribed her 
Oxycontin. See McBride, 940 P.2d at 544). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
B. The trial court did not consider the cost of methadone in 
calculating the amount of restitution. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly "determined that [she] owed 
restitution for the cost of Oxycontin minus the cost of Methadone" because there was 
insufficient evidence to establish "that Methadone was a proper medication in lieu of 
Oxycontin," Aplt. Br. at 22-23. However, because the trial court never found that 
methadone was a proper medication in lieu of Oxycontin. defendant's claim fails. 
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Defendant's PSI stated "that while defendant. . . was receiving 514,647.00 in 
WCF prescrition benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin, she was gainfully employed . . . 
under [an] assumed name" (R. 61:2-3; Addendum B). The PSI then calculated 
restitution costs for Oxycontin at $14, 377.56, "the cost difference between the 
Oxycontin [defendant] received over an 18 month time period and Methadone [which] 
is substantially cheaper to prescribe, and is considered a substitute medication for the 
Oxycontin" (R. 61:7; R. 77:9). 
At sentencing, defendant objected to the use of methadone as an off-set to the 
cost of Oxycontin, arguing that "the formula of comparing Oxycontin to methadone is 
based on [a] false premise" (R. 77:15; Addendum E). Defendant explained: "The state 
is calculating this number based on the assumption of methadone which is a very low 
cost drug would have been prescribed"; however, a note from Dr. Dall "says we started 
her on methadone [and] [s]he had a severe skin rash" (R. 77:17; Addendum E). 
In response to defendant's argument, the trial court stated: "Let's not offset the 
methadone. Let's just have her pay for the medication she never should have obtained 
. . . . If you don't want to have an offset for what it would have cost for methadone 
that's fine with me" (R. 77:17; Addendum E). "I was wanting to deduct what they 
would have been willing to prescribe. You told me not to do that, so that's okay. Let's 
not do that" (R. 77:18; Addendum E). The trial court then ordered defendant to pay 
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restitution in the amount of SI 4,647, the full amount that defendant received "in WCF 
prescrition benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin" (R. 61:2; R. 92). 
Because the trial court never found that "Methadone was a proper medication in 
lieu of Oxycontin," Aplt. Br. at 22, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting such a finding fails.3 
IV. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO CORRECT ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN HER PSI 
IS INADEQUATELY BRIEF AND SHOULD NOT BE REACHED; 
THE ONE ALLEGED OBJECTION IDENTIFIED IN HER BRIEF 
DID NOT WARRANT TRIAL COURT ACTION. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred because it did not make specific 
findings on the record after [she] repeatedly objected to the contents of the [PSI] and 
asked the court to correct mistakes in the report." Aplt. Br. at 28. However, only two 
3To the extent defendant's claim rests on a contention that the trial court should 
have used some other medication as a substitute for Oxycontin rather than methadone, 
that claim fails because any error was invited. This Court will not consider "can error 
committed at trial when [the complaining] party led the trial court into committing the 
error.,,, State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 617 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). Here, defendant argued that methadone was not an 
appropriate substitute for Oxycontin because it allegedly gave her a severe skin rash (R. 
77:17). Accepting defendant's argument, the trial court decided not to offset the cost of 
the Oxycontin with the cost of methadone (R. 17-18). Defendant neither objected to that 
decision nor offered any evidence that a different medication was a more appropriate 
substitute for Oxycontin than methadone. Thus, defendant invited any error caused by the 
trial court's failure to consider other possible substitutes. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (holding defendant "cannot lead the court into error by failing to 
object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions" 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Betha, 957 P.2d at 617 (holding 
defendant cannot complain on appeal where "it was defendant's counsel who requested 
the court's ruling"). 
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alleged objections are identifiable from defendant's brief. Because the bases of her 
remaining conclusory statements are unclear from the record, this Court should refuse to 
consider them. The two bases identified in defendant's brief fail on the merits. 
Section 77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code provides that ~[a]ny alleged inaccuracies 
in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and 
the department [of corrections] prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). The court may then 
grant the parties "an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies." 
Id. If the inaccuracies remain unresolved, "the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record." Id. 
As the supreme court has held, this section "requires the sentencing judge to 
consider the party's objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether 
the information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that 
information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, *[*[ 44-45, 
973 P.2d 404; see also State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ 13, 6 P.3d 1133. 
A. Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed. 
Under rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant's brief 
must contain an argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Thus, this Court " i s entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
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which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research/*' State v. 
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439. 
450 (Utah 1988)) (additional citation omitted). Utah courts have consistently refused to 
consider issues that have not been adequately briefed. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 
299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); see also 
MacKay v. Hardy, 913 P.2d 941, 947-49 (Utah 1998); Walker v. U.S. Gen.t Inc., 916 
P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197. 198 (Utah App. 1996). 
Here, defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to make specific 
findings on the record after she "objected repeatedly to the [PSFs] inclusion of conduct 
for which she was not convicted, did not plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility" 
and objected "concerning the [PSFs] assumptions that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to 
receive medical benefits, that Oxycontin would not have been prescribed based on her 
admitted conduct, and that Methadone would have been prescribed in the absence of 
fraud." Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant then cites to various pages of the record. Aplt. Br. at 
28 (citing to R. 77:7, 11-13, 17, 19-20); Aplt. Br. at 30 (citing to same). However, no 
explicit objections to defendant's PSI appear on those pages. Thus, both the State and 
this Court must guess as to what specific objections defendant now claims were made. 
See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (holding issues on appeal should be "clearly defined"). 
Consequently, this Court should refuse to consider this part of defendant's claim. 
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B. Because defendant never asked the trial court to correct her PSI 
in connection with her attorney's alleged fraud, this claim is 
waived; in any case, the challenged statements did not appear in 
the PSI but, rather, in a different part of the record. 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988). "One of the primary 
reasons for [this rule] is to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a 
claim that it erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1992). Thus, "[t]he 
objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error of which 
counsel complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, "that issue is not properly preserved for 
appeal," State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993)). 
Here, defendant claims that the trial court made "no specific findings" and "did 
not even address" defense counsel's alleged claim that the PSI inaccurately portrayed 
him as a participant in defendant's fraud. Aplt. Br. at 30. However, defendant never 
specifically objected to the PSI's statements concerning her attorney's alleged conduct 
and never specifically asked the trial court to make any correction thereto. Rather, as 
defendant herself acknowledges in her brief, counsel stated only that "[t]here*s one 
major correction or clarification and these the court needs to take notice of* (R. 77:7; 
Addendum E) (emphasis added). Then, after explaining that clarification, counsel 
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concluded by stating, "I mean it's obvious that those assertions are simply untrue in 
regard to [defendant] and I" (R. 77:7; Addendum E). Nothing in counsel's statements 
would have alerted the trial court that a correction to the PSI was requested. Thus, no 
objection to the PSI was raised in a manner "specific enough to give the trial court 
notice of the very error of which counsel complains." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546: see also 
Veveto, 2001 UT 62, j^ 15. 6 P.3d 1133 (noting defendant both raised his objections 
before the trial court and presented evidence thereon): KohL 2000 UT 35. at«[ 34 (noting 
defendant "objected" to the PSI and "[specifically" identified his claims). 
Consequently this claim was waived. 
In any case, it was not the PSI that contained the objectionable material. The PSI 
states only that "defendant's attorney . . . sent a fax to WCF in early October consisting 
of Court dockets from the current case" on which he had "circled only Counts Three and 
Four . . . highlighting the fact these charges had been dismissed, and as a result WCF 
should pay for the Oxycontin" (R. 61:6). Thus, the PSI does not necessarily suggest that 
defense counsel had done anything improper. Rather, it was another part of the record, 
a fax sheet from WCF to the prosecutor concerning defense counsel's fax, that 
suggested defendant "is continuing the same fraud for which she plead guilty" and that 
"[n]ow it would appear she has her public defender assisting her in this 
misrepresentation" (R. 45). Because defendant's objection did not in fact involve the 
PSI, neither section 77-18-l(6)(a) nor Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, apply. 
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Consequently, defendant's claim on this basis fails. 
C. Defendant's objection to methadone as an Oxycontin substitute 
was addressed by the trial court on the record. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court failed to make findings concerning 
the PSI's assumption "that [she] was lying when she said that she was allergic to 
Methadone." Aplt. Br. at 30 (citing R. 77:17, 19-20; Addendum E). However, in fact 
the trial court implicitly accepted defendant's contention that she was allergic to 
methadone when it stated, "Let's not offset the methadone." (R. 77:17: Addendum E). 
See Point III.B. supra. Although it is true that "[statements concerning the court's view 
of the defendant and the case in general.. . do not fully meet the requirements of section 
77-18-l(6)(a)," Jaegar, 1999 UT 1,1j 45, the trial court's statement here was not 
"general" but rather specifically addressed defendant's claim, indicating its acceptance 
of defendant's argument and its determination that whether defendant was able to take 
methadone "[was] [irrelevant to the issue of sentencing." Id. at f^ 44.4 
Consequently, defendant's claim on this basis also fails. 
4To the extent this Court determines the trial court's finding on this matter is 
insufficient, "the proper remedy is to remand [the] case to the trial court with 
instructions that it expressly resolve [the defendant's] objections in full compliance with 
section 77-18-1 (60(a)." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT Mf 45, 973 P.2d 404. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
restitution order. If this Court concludes that additional findings concerning the PSFs 
accuracy are required, this Court should remand the matter to the trial court for that 
limited purpose. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 4^L January 2002. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). * 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
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(d) u) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
<e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of prdperty of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, $ 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. Il l , effective May 1. 1995, added 
uor for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4)<a)(i). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(l)(d), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection i2), and added 
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in 
Subsection (4X0" at the end of Subsection 
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection 
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
aMay 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2 Kg), which read: "on or after April 29, 1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-
section i2)(h) as Subsection (2Kg); deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996. in Subsection (2Kb) substituted 
uremoval or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection 
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
(4XaXvii) and (4XdXiv). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998. 
in Subsection (4)(aXi) substituted ^Subsection 
(l)(e)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and 
family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5XcXi), (5Hc)(ii), and (8Xc). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
in Subsection (6Xe). substituted "aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation 
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" 
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
tice" and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to 
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as" amended by ch. 301, as Subsection 
(4XaXvib 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995; 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
Cross-References. — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et 
seq. 
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq. 
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq. 
Restitution as condition of probation, § 77-
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R.Cnm.P. 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Aggravating factors. 
— Bodily injury to victim. 
— Seventy of offense. 
—Sufficient. 
Arrest record. 
— Effect on sentence. 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of noncompliance. 
Informal procedure. 
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— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
il) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
fii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department, 
i c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
<d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection 13)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
< e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
14> Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
'5) a; Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may. with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
<b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
<i) identify the victim of the offense; 
<ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201< 4 > 
by the defendant; 
< iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
Uv) describe any change in the victims personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404. 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
»6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b> If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
<7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
< iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (lOMaXi), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
<B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
uii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court. 
<b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable, 
i l l) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) u) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
lb) li) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim s authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim s household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
ib» The department shall establish procedures and standards for nome 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection < 17). 
17) i a> If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
ib> The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
ic) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
lii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
id) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
<i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
lii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
<e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO 
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
EL ESTADO DE UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
El Demandante, 
versus 
contra 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
EL DOCUMENTO DECLARATORIO DEL 
ACUSADO, LOS CERTIFICADOS DE LOS 
ABOGADOS Y LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ 
CASE NO. ?<f/<?1/te</f$ 
N° DE CASO 
Defendant 
El Acusado 
COMES NOW /jl/flf) M/lf r//)S. J» the defendant in this case, and hereby 
ledges and certifies tfUTfollowing: ^/ acknow  
COMPARECE 
reconoce y certifica lo siguiente: 
_, el acusado en este caso, y por este medio 
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
EL DELITO Y LA DISPOSICION 
ESTABLECIDA POR LA LEY 
DEGREE 
GRADO 
PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
ELCASTIGO 
Minimo, rnaximo y/o 
Jr?/ 
tfftfen y~ 
c. 
fa/hi: 6#s/?^ /ZffZFl*///&tf/i/n/rr<^: 
8 / 9 9 
I have received a copy of the Information against me,! have read it, and I understand the nature 
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty. 
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos 
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
Los elementos del delito(sY del cual se me acusa son los siguientes: 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes 
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows: 
Mi conducta y la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy pepalment^responsahk, y que^onstituye 
los elementos del delito(s) imputado. es la siguiente: , fjdJfn W -/-f 'yT " ^ 4 (^1L/ nlC/Jrh^ 
J>y <ff/cm/ a<nt?rf\t/) f?#4<4~<Xn «6f/ ,ke- UWi^rS 
—7^ &£)/*</) 5&V7H ^fWT} m/>. 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
Doy entrada a esta declaracion(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la 
siguiente information: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, 
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence 
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado, y si no tengo los fondos para contratar 
uno, el tribunal me asignara un abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de mi pena puede ser que 
se me requiera pagar una cantidad, determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado, si es que 
se me asignara uno. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have 
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un 
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones: 
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature 
and elements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
3. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener unabogado, he leidoeste documentoy entiendo lanaturaleza 
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este caso y otros actos procesales, y las consecuencias de mi 
declaracion de culpabilidad. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / \ 2 @ v v ^ / ^ and I 
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
plea with my attorney. 
4. Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado es , 
y he tenido la oportunidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos y las 
consecuencias de mi declaracion de culpabilidad. 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am 
giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
5. Se que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado imparcial, y que al 
declaraime culpable renuncio a ese derecho. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compel 
my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
6. Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo el derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra, 
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien se que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis testigo(s), por medio 
de un citatorio costeado por el Estado, a testificar a mi favor en el tribunal. Entiendo que al declararme culpable 
renuncio a estos derechos. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so, I cannot 
be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against 
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
7. Se que tengo el derecho a testificar a mi favor, pero si elijo no hacerlo, no se me puede obligar 
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inferencia desfavorable se sacara en mi contra si no testifico. 
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a estos derechos. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the 
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element 
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
8. Se que si deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto se fijara para 
un juicio. En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obligation de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que 
quepa duda razonable. Si el juicio es ante un jurado, el veredicto tiene que ser unanime. 
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9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I 
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if 
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone 
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda 
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la 
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the 
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, 
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the State-1 understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
10. Se que bajo la Constitution de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendria el 
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita, en la Corte 
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria 
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty. 
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence 
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an 
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges 
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement 
11. Se cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable. 
Se que al declaranne culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria, me estare sometiendo a 
cumplir esa pena minima obligatoria por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas y pueden consistir 
en una condena penitenciaria, una multa, o ambas. Se que ademas de una multa, se impondra un recargo de 
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier victima(s) 
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este 
convenio declaratorio, si estos existieran. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional 
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por periodos consecutivos, o la multa en una cantidad 
adicional, si me declaro culpable de mas de un delito. Tambien se que si estoy bajo libertad condicional 
probatoria ("probation"), o libertad preparatoria ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro delito 
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaration de culpabilidad en la presente 
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecutivas. 
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory 
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s), 
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. Se y entiendo que al declaranne culpable renuncio a los derechos legales y constitucionales 
enumerados en los parrafos anteriores. Tambien se que al dar entrada a tal declaracion(es), admito que he 
cometido la conducta que se alega y que soy culpable del delito(s) por el cual se da entrada a mi declaracion(es). 
- 5 -
14, My plea(s) of guilty (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement. 
14. Mi declaration de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convenio declaratono entre el 
abogado acusador y yo. Las promesas, obligaciones y estipulaciones de este convenio declaratono, si existen 
algunas, se encuentran en su totalidad en este documento. 
15. I kiiow and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good 
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
15. Se y entiendo que cualquier petition para retirar mi declaracion(es) de culpabilidad ha de 
interponerse dentro de treinta (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por 
escrito, y debe existir causa justificada. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions 
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court 
16. Se que el Juez no tiene que regirse por cualquier concesion de cargo o de pena, o recomendacion 
de libertad conditional probatoria o pena suspendida, incluyendo una reduction de los cargos para la imposition 
de la pena hecha o solicitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco 
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez. 
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead 
guilty, and no promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
17. No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o influenciado ilegalmente para inducirme a declararme 
culpable, y no se me ha hecho ninguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement I do not 
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct 
18. He leido este documento, o mi abogado me lo ha leido, y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que 
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contenida en este documento. No deseo hacer ningiin cambio porque 
todas las afirmaciones son correctas. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. Estoy satisfecho con el asesoramiento y la ayuda de mi abogado. 
20. I am years of age; I have attended school through \X\d5£J/ grade; and I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment 
20. Tengo anos de edad, he asistido a la escuela hasta el grado y puedo leer y entender 
espanol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de ninguna 
droga, medicamento o bebida alcoholica que pudiera perjudicar mi criterio cuando se tomo la decision de dar 
entrada a la declaracion(es). Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o bebida 
alcoholica que perjudique mi cnterio. 
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21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that 
would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
21. Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las 
consecuencias de mi declaracion, y libre de cualquier enfermedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me 
prevmiera dar entrada a mi declaracion a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
22. Other: 
22. Anadido: 
Dated this' d a y j f c ^ ^ / ^ ^ 199^ ^ O^O O 
Fechado el dia del mes de de 1999. 
DEFENDANT 
EL ACUSADO 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant above, and 
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Certifico que soy el abogado de , el antedicho acusado(a), y se 
que el (ella) ha leido el documento, 0 que se lo he leido yo, y lo he discutido con el (ella), y creo que entiende 
el significado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esta mental y fisicamente competente. A mi leal saber 
y entender, despues de una investigation apropiada, los elementos del delito(s) y la sinopsis factual de la 
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y 
afirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certeros y verdaderos. 
/Altorn^y for Defendant / Bar No. 
El Abogado del Acusado / N° de Abogacia 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct which constitutes the offenses) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court 
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for 
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest 
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de , 
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratorio del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de la 
conducta delictiva del acusado que constituye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado 
ningun incentivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaration de culpabilidad. Las 
negociaciones declaratorias se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convenio Declaratorio, o 
como complemento en las actas del tribunal. Existe motivo fundado para creer que la prueba respaldaria la 
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta 
declaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadania. 
attorney J 
>gado Acusador / N° de Abogacia 
ORDER 
LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the defendant's piea(s) of guilty to the chargers) set forth in 
the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certification del acusado y de los 
abogados, el Juez atestigua las firmas y determina que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace 
libre y voluntariamente, y asi se ordena que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargo(s) 
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada. 
Dated this 5 day of 
Fechado el dia de de 1999. 
DISTRICT COURT 
El JUEZ DEL TRIB 
GE 
'AL DEL DISTRITO 
Addendum C 
PRIVATE 
FILED Dir 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE?/ ^(y 
REGION III OFFICE *^~ 
36 West Fremont Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 239-2103 
Deyoiy : 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: 10-18-00 
Sentencing Date: 10-23-00 
JUDGE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE SALT LAKE UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
C. TODD ORGILL CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN COURT CASE NO: 991921564 
ALIASES: DYAN STEWARD; DYAN 
PIEMME OBSCIS NO: 141737 
ADDRESS: 1410 W. 600 SO. CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE 
SLQUT 84104 
BIRTHDATE: 08-18-58 AGE: 42 OFFENSE: WORKERS COMPENSATION FRAUD. 
F2; ATT. POSS C/S W/ INTENT TO DIST., F3 
BIRTHPLACE: REDDING, CA PLEA: GUILTY DATE: 09-05-00 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH PROS. ATTORNEY: CLARK HARMS 
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED DEF. ATTORNEY: RALPH DELLAPIANA 
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MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with Count One, Workers Compensation Insurance Fraud, 
Second Degree Felony; Count Two, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute, Second Degree Felony; Count Three, Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud, 
Third Degree Felony; and Count Four, Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud, Third Degree 
Felony. Through plea negotiations, Count Two was amended to Attempted Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, Third Degree Felony, and Counts Three and Four 
were dismissed. The defendant pled guilty to Count One as charged, and the amended Count 
Two charge. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Court dockets and District Attorney file 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On November 10, 1991, the defendant, Dyan Lynn Martinez ("Martinez"), was employed by 
Olsen's Greenhouse Gardens, an insured of the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCF"). 
On November 11, 1991, defendant Martinez reported to her employer she had injured her back 
the previous day (November 10, 1991), while moving a bench in the course of her employment. 
On November 21, 1991, a claim was filed with WCF in the form of an Employers Initial Report 
of Injury, which claim resulted in the payment by WCF of medical and lost wage benefits 
totaling $123, 463.98, including three surgeries and lost wages compensation after each surgery. 
On March 21, 1994, defendant Martinez represented to the Utah Industrial Commission she was 
permanently totally disabled (PTD) as a result of the November 10, 1991 industrial injury. As 
part of the Compensation Agreement, WCF agreed that medical expenses resulting from the 
industrial injury would continue to be paid by WCF. Because of this agreement, WCF received 
three bills from United Drugs from August 4, 1997 to March 4, 1999, listing prescriptions over 
an extended period of time (six months to a year for each separate bill). The three bills totaled 
$16,152.41. -A majority of the bill ($14,647.00) was for a single prescription drug, Oxycontin. an 
opiate pain reliever, whicB is aka a schedule U controlled substance. 
WCF Investigator Larry McDonald discovered that while defendant Martinez was receiving 
$14,647.00 in WCF prescription benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin, she was gainfully 
employed from February 27, 1996 to February of 1997, and from February, 1998 to September 
29, 1998 by Salt Lake Community College (South Campus) Food Services, under the assumed 
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MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued) 
name of Deborah Lee Hardy, and an assumed Social Security Number of 560-13-1654 (which 
had legitimately been issued to Linda Elain Berchard). During her terms of employment with 
Salt Lake Community College, defendant Martinez worked between 25 to 30 hours per week in 
the cafeteria. Defendant Martinez's supervisor; Kevin Doney, told WCF Investigator McDonald 
that he observed no difficulty for defendant Martinez aka Hardy performing her assigned duties 
which included lifting 20 pound buckets of ice at least twice a day, four to six hours of standing 
as a cashier, and cooking. Defendant Martinez obtained Utah Identification Care #159923646 in 
the name of Deborah Lee Hardy. Defendant Martinez omitted all reference to her gainful 
employment in her communications with Dr. Dall and WCF claims adjuster Lorena Ericson. 
On September 22, 1997, defendant Martinez represented to Dr. Joel T. Dall, M.D. and WCF that 
because of continuing back pain, she was unable to function without continuous pain medication. 
Dr. Dall prescribed Oxycontin. From September 22, 1997 through March 4, 1999, defendant 
Martinez represented to Dr. Dall and WCF that her need for Oxycontin increased from 10 gm to 
120 mg a day. 
From September 22, 1997 through December 31, 1997, Dr. Dall intended to prescribe defendant 
Martinez a total of 246 Oxycontin 10 mg pills. However, through artifice, scheme and fraud. 
defendant Martinez was able to obtain actual prescriptions for 450 Oxycontin lOmg pills. 
From January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1998, Dr. Dall intended to prescribe defendant 
Martinez a total of 2160 Oxycontin 10 mg pills. However, through artifice, scheme and fraud 
defendant Martinez was able to obtain actual prescriptions for 3600 Oxycontin lOmg pills, and 
was able to obtain actual medications totaling 4410 Oxycontin lOmg pills. On November 17, 
1998, Dr. Dall confronted defendant Martinez about her obtaining more Oxycontin than he 
intended, and defendant Martinez misrepresented to him that she was really only getting 180 
tablets. Contrary to Dr. Dall's instructions, defendant Martinez continued to obtain amounts of 
Oxycontin far exceeding the amount Dr. Dall intended. 
Special Agent Montefusco found two prescription bottles of Oxycontin, in the name of Martinez, 
in the possession of Sundowners during the arrests and round-up of the Salt Lake City Chapter of 
the Sundowner Motorcycle Club in January and February of 1999. 
On March 1, 1999, Dr. Dall told WCF investigator McDonald that if he had known that 
defendant Martinez was gainfully employed under an alias, or was receiving an average of 
approximately 360 Oxycontin lOmg pills per month, he would not have prescribed Oxycontin for 
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued) 
the defendant. 
WCF reports that had they known of defendant Martinez's gainful employment under the 
assumed name, her medical and prescription benefits would have been terminated, and no 
Oxycontin would have been prescribed by Dr. Dall or paid for by WCF. The Oxycontin obtained 
by defendant Martinez by means of false representations and omissions cost WCF $14,647.00. 
On or about September 8, 1998, Richard (Blue) Knudsen and Defendant Dyan Lynn Martinez 
engaged in conversation at, 17 South 800 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, during which Knudsen 
stated to the Defendant, "Do you want dope? I'll bring you some dope tomorrow. I'll be able to 
get you at least half... I could get at least a half gram...." The Defendant replied, "all right/' 
On or about October 8, 1998, in a telephone conversation with Richard (Blue) Knudsen, over 
telephone number (801) 363-4470, subscribed to 17 South 800 West, Salt lake City, Utah, the 
Defendant stated, that she just got home and was calling to tell Knudsen that she is "pretty in 
pink/' The Defendant asks Knudsen "either way you can swing it?" to which Knudsen replies in 
the affirmative. The Defendant then states, "That would be great because I need to try and come 
up with some cash for Cork, cause he needs some help on that, okay?" Knudsen again replied in 
the affirmative. 
The results of an investigation of over one year conducted by the FBI and the Salt Lake City 
Police Department which revealed that both the Defendant and Knudsen uses, possess and 
distribute the Schedule II controlled substance, Oxycontin. 
Based upon FBI Special Agent Montefiisco's experience, training and belief, as well as upon the 
results of this investigation, it was his opinion that the phrase "pretty in pink" specifically refers 
to the possession of lOmg tablet of Oxycontin, and that the subject of the defendant's telephone 
calls from September 8, 1998, to October 8, 1998 is and was the distribution of Oxycontin 
(Oxycodone), a Schedule II controlled substance. 
During the arrests of members of the Sundowners Motorcycle Club and their associates in late 
January and early February of 1999, two of the persons arrested were in possession of 
prescription bottles of Oxycontin, which had been prescribed to, and obtained by the Defendant. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION. 
District Attorney file and Probable Cause Statement 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
"Jan 28, 1999 FBI arrested me for arranging to distribute along with Salt Lake City Sundowners 
They stopped me and Mike Steward when we left the clubhouse. They wouldn't explain why 
other than to say it was part of a bigger investigation. I was bailed out. Then arrested 24 hrs 
later when I went to pick up my truck at the FBI Biding. I was reincarscerated on the same 
charge that I was currently on bail on. They said they weren't interested in me but certain 
members of the club. They asked me to testify against them in court and they would let me go. I 
said no I had no knowledge of what they were talking about. So they threatened to file charges 
of securities fraud, comp. fraud and anything else they could dig up, and they did. The fraud 
charges stemmed from c96 when my first husband was alive. He was very sick and we couldn't 
afford to pay for his necessary medication so after exhausting all avenues of possible assistance I 
attempted to work part time under an alias but was fired for excessive absence. My first husband 
was a Sundowner and died Jan 6, 1999 23 days before the arrests. I believe I made a bad choice 
in trying to work but at the time my concern was for my husband of 21 yrs marriage. I didn't 
want to see him die, unfortunately he did and everything has been a nightmare since. 
/s/ Dyan Martinez "09-15-00M 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: 
There are no co-defendants in the current matter. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. 
District Attorney file 
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
Larry C. McDonald, Investigator for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, stated since the 
defendant served several months in a federal prison and was placed on Supervised Release 
through the United States Probation Office, she has continued to try and obtain Oxycontin. Mr. 
McDonald clarified that since the current casecame to fruition officials of WCF stated they 
would not pay for any more Oxycontin in the future due to her extended abuse of the narcotic. 
Despite this agreement, Mr. McDonald stated the defendant recently returned to Joel T. Dall, 
M.D., and received yet another prescription for Oxycontin. Further, he noted Ms. Martinez has 
repeatedly called the adjuster at WCF and indicated the criminal drug charges involving 
Oxycontin had been dismissed, and as a result WCF should be obligated to pay for the 
prescription medication. He noted the defendant's attorney, Ralph Dellapiana, also sent a fax to 
WCF in early October consisting of Court dockets from the current case. In the Court dockets, 
Mr. McDonald stated Mr. Dellapiana circled only Counts Three and Four of the current case 
highlighting the fact these charges had been dismissed, and as a result WCF should pay for the 
Oxycontin. 
Mr. McDonald noted that an alternative to the Oxycontin is Methadone. He noted the defendant 
claims she cannot take Methadone because she develops a rash. Mr. McDonald surmised that her 
developing a rash is not the real reason she does not want Methadone. Instead, he surmised she 
does not want Methadone because it has no street value, in contrast to the Oxycontin. 
He noted the large amounts of Oxycontin obtained by the defendant in the past far exceeded one 
persons dosage. He noted the only time such a large amount of Oxycontin is prescribed is when 
the patient is a terminal cancer patient that is due to expire soon. Mr. McDonald stated he has no 
doubts the defendant was distributing the Oxycontin to her associates. 
Also of concern to Mr. McDonald was the fact Dr. Dall continues to prescribe the defendant 
Oxycontin. He noted it is evident from Dr. Dall's own notes that he is accepting the defendant's 
claim all drug charges pertaining to Oxycontin has been dismissed despite his ongoing contact 
with WCF and the fact Ms. Martinez served several months in a federal prison. 
Mr. McDonald recommended the defendant w4serve some time," and be required to enter a drug 
rehabilitation program. He noted Ms. Martinez is abusing a system that is intended to protect 
injured workers. Mr. McDonald stated this premise makes her behavior even more ^despicable." 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Contact with Larry McDonald of the WCF 
RESTITUTION 
COURT CASE # COUNT # VICTIM AMOUNT 
991921564 1 Worker's Compensation $17,690.16 
Fund of Utah 
Comments: 
The above figure includes $14,377.56 financial loss from fraud, $2,340.00 investigative costs, 
$642.00 in surveillance, $180.00 administrative costs, $135.00 clerical costs, and $15.60 copying 
costs. The $14,377.56 is the cost difference between the Oxycontin Ms. Martinez received over 
an 18 month time period and Methadone. Per Mr. McDonald, the Methadone is substantially 
cheaper to prescribe, and is considered a substitute medication for the Oxycontin. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Contact with Larry McDonald of the WCF 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
The defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on May 11, 1999, and was released on 
December 17, 1999. Therefore, as of the October 23, 2000, sentencing date, Ms. Martinez has 
served 220 days in jail. " ~ 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
The defendant does not possess a history of Juvenile Court referrals in the State of Utah. 
PAGE 8 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Utah State Juvenile Court records 
ADULT RECORD: 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
01-28-99 FBI - SLC, UT Unlawful Dist. C/S None Listed 
02-03-99 
05-11-99 
FBI - SLC, UT 
U.S. Marshall's 
Service 
WAS Dist. / Offer / 
Arrange to Dist. 
Counterfeit C/S, Felony 
WAS Insurance Fraud; 
WAS Poss. C/S, Second 
Degree Felony; 
WAS Poss. C/S w/ Intent 
to Dist., Third Degree 
Felony 
WAS Poss. Contraband by 
Prisoner, Third Degree 
Felony; 
WAS Agg. Assault, Third 
Degree Felony 
Dismissed (991902495) 
CURRENT OFFENSE 
Convicted of Poss. Contraband 
by Prisoner, Class A Misd., 90 
days jail (991700477, Second 
District Court, Farmington. UT) 
Dismissed (991908657) 
Comments: 
Although not listed on the rap sheets received by this investigator, the defendant was convicted 
of Fraudulent Concealment of Employment, Felony (Social Security Fraud) in United States 
District Court. She was ordered to serve 12 months in a Federal Prison, and placed on 36 months 
supervised release through the United States Probation Office. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office rap sheet (SO# 234496), Utah Criminal History record (SID# 
512753), Court dockets, the defendant, and contact with Eric Anderson of the United States 
Probation Office 
PENDING CASES: 
It appears the defendant has no pending cases. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Court dockets 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
On April 24, 2000, the defendant was granted supervised release through the United States 
Probation Office after pleading guilty to Fraudulent Conceal of Employment, Felony (Social 
Security Fraud) in United States District Court. Although the specific conditions of her parole 
agreement is not known, Eric Anderson of the United States Probation Office in Ogden, Utah 
noted the defendant is "doing well." He indicated the defendant has completed mental health 
treatment through ISAT, is making restitution payments as required, and has tested negative on 
all urinalysis tests. Mr. Anderson stated he plans to be present for the sentencing scheduled on 
October 23, 2000. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Contact with Eric Anderson of the United States Probation Office (1-801-625-5680, ext. 77) 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
oDyan Lynn Martinez was born in Redding, California on August 18, 1958. The defendant, and 
her two older sisters, were raised in a middle economic environment by both natural parents. 
Reportedly, the defendant's father was employed as an operating engineer, while her mother was 
a teacher. Although the defendant described her childhood as "good," she noted her father was 
physically abusive and an "asshole." Due to the continued problems she had with her father, she 
left home at age 13 and lived with friends.. Thereafter, she never had contact with any of her 
family again. At age 22, the defendant left California and moved to Utah where she has 
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued) 
continued to reside. The defendant has not had any contact with her parents or siblings in nearly 
30 years. 
Currently, the defendant is residing with her husband, Mike Steward, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MARITAL HISTORY 
On August 12, 1978, the defendant married Mike Martinez in California. Mr. Martinez died on 
January 6, 1999 of diabetes. Two children, currently ages 21 and 17, were born to this 
relationship. 
On August 17, 1999, the defendant married Mike Steward in Utah. They have remained married. 
No children have been born to this relationship. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
EDUCATION: 
The defendant withdrew from El Capitan High School, located in San Diego, California, during 
the tenth grade. She withdrew from school prematurely because she was "working full-time." 
Per the defendant, she obtained her GED while in a Carsell, Texas Federal Prison earlier this 
year. At an unspecified time in the past, the defendant attended the Grossmont Junior College in 
LaMesa, California for three semesters. Ms. Martinez entered Grossmont after lying about 
obtaining her high school diploma. She did not express a desire to obtain additional schooling in 
the future. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
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GANG AFFILIATIONS: 
The defendant is not affiliated with any local gangs. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: 
In 1991, the defendant injured her back while working. Specifically, the defendant suffered 
herniated discs. Since the injury, the defendant has had four back surgeries. Currently, the 
defendant is not ingesting any prescription medication. Ms. Martinez indicated she has been 
prohibited from ingesting certain types of medication due to the nature of the current charges. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MENTAL HEALTH: 
The defendant described her current emotional health as "good." She acknowledged that after 
being released from federal prison in April of the current year she went to ISAT for an 
evaluation. After completing the evaluation, Ms. Martinez stated ISAT officials required she 
attend four mental health sessions. Reportedly, she initiated the sessions on September 19, 2000. 
She has never taken medication for emotional or psychiatric problems. Ms. Martinez has never 
considered suicide, nor has she been physically or sexually abused in the past. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. 
The defendant 
ALCOHOL HISTORY: 
The defendant initially began using alcohol as a teenager. She denied ever abusing the 
substance, and noted she has never receiving counseling for alcohol abuse. Currently, the 
defendant rarely consumes alcohol. Reportedly, she has had approximately three beers since 
April of the current year. Ms. Martinez did not express a desire to participate in alcohol abuse 
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ALCOHOL HISTORY: (continued) 
counseling at the current time. She denied being under the influence of alcohol at any time 
during the commitment of the current offense. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
DRUG HISTORY: 
The defendant used marijuana occasionally as a teenager. She denied using any other 
substances, and has never received any therapy that addresses drug issues. Ms. Martinez did not 
express a desire to participate in drug abuse counseling at the current time. She denied being 
under the influence of any illicit drugs during the course of the present offense. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
The defendant's Social Security Number is 560-11-1456 
REASON 
EMPLOYER WAGE TITLE START/END FOR LEAVING 
Olson's Greenhouse Unspecified Grower Nine years ago Unspecified 
Comments: 
Reportedly, Olson's Greenhouse was the place of employment where she injured her back Ms 
Martinez has not worked in nearly nine years. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
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FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
The defendant receives $239 per month from Social Security, and $1,040 from Worker's 
Compensation Fund of Utah. Her husband's gross month income is approximately $1,080. 
Their monthly expenses, which include utilities ($300), food ($400), rent ($264), insurance 
($54), restitution ($100), and storage ($108), amounts to $1,226. In 1988, the defendant filed 
bankruptcy. Her only listed asset is a 1973 Ford truck worth $500. She has no assets. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MILITARY RECORD: 
The defendant has never been a member of the United States Armed Forces. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: 
This investigator was unable to establish contact with the assigned prosecutor, Clark Harms, 
prior to the date of dictation. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Now appearing before the court for sentencing on the offense of Workers Compensation 
Insurance Fraud, Second Degree Felony, and Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute, Third Degree Felony is Dyan Lynn Martinez, a 42 year old female. 
Utah State Juvenile Court records failed to reveal any previous referrals. As an adult, the 
defendant has been arrested two prior times and been convicted of one felonyand one 
misdemeanor. Ms. Martinez served several months in a^ Texas fe3eraTprisorTfor the felony 
conviction, and has been on Supervised Release throttglrthe^United"States Probation Office since 
April of the current year. She has no pending cases at the current time. 
For an extended period of time the defendant abused a system established to assist individuals 
hurt while on the job. Not only did she continue receiving payments from the Worker's 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY (continued) 
Compensation Fund of Utah while working at the Salt Lake Community College, but she also 
was able to distribute Oxycontin to her Sundowner associates by altering the prescription to 
obtain large quantities of the drug. Not only is this conduct completely inappropriate and 
deserved of jail time, but there have also been allegations she has recently contacted WCF on an 
incessant basis claiming they should pay for the drug because all charges pertaining to the * 
Oxycontin have been dismissed. Obviously, these claims are simply untrue as evidenced by the 
defendant's guilty plea to Count Two of the current case. 
Although the defendant denied having a substance abuse problem, this agency believes that 
based upon the nature of the current offense, and the allegations she has continued to try and 
obtain Oxycontin, it appears a substance abuse evaluation is warranted. If determined 
appropriate as a result of the evaluation, the defendant should be required to participate in drug 
treatment. 
REPORT PREPARED BY, 
C TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
KATMERINE SHEPHERD, 
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
It is the recommendation of the Staff of Court Services, Adult Probation and Parole, the defendant be 
granted supervised probation under the following conditions: 
1. The defendant serve 120 days in the Salt Lake County Jail with no credit for time served; 
2. The defendant pay a $400 fine, plus an 85% surcharge; 
3. The defendant pay a recoupment fee for the services of her Court appointed attorney; 
4. The defendant pay $17,690.16 restitution to Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah; 
5. The defendant obtain a substance abuse evaluation administered through an appropriate agency, 
and comply with any treatment measures recommended thereafter; 
6. The defendant abide by all guidelines of the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah; 
7. The defendant abide by all conditions of her Supervised Release Agreement through the United 
States Probation Office; 
8. The defendant ingest medications as prescribed by a licensed physician. These medications 
should be approved by her assigned probation officer; 
9. The defendant use no alcohol or illicit drugs while on probation and not frequent establishments 
where alcohol is the chief item of order; 
10. The defendant submit her person, auto, place of residence or any property under her control to 
search for the detection of alcohol or drugs by the probation officer, and submit to drug testing at 
the request of the probation officer; 
11. The defendant not frequent places where drugs are used or sold, not associate with persons 
known to use non-prescribed controlled substances, and not obtain prescriptions for controlled 
substances without prior knowledge of the probation officer. 
REPORT PREPARED BY, 
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
u& 
iTHERINE SHEPHERD, 
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
F0RM1 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
These are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender. 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVCTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS) 
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 
1 
0 NONE 
2 ONE 
4 TWO 
6 THREE 
8 MORE THAN THREE 
0 NONE 
1 ONE 
2 TWO TO FOUR ___ 
3 FIVE TO SEVEN 
4 MORE THAN SEVEN 
PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OFFENSES THAT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN FELONIES IF 
COMMITTED BY AND ADULT)(THREE 
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL 
ONE FELONY ADJUDICATION) 
SUPERVISION HISTORY 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
0 NONE 
1 ONE 
2 TWO TO FOUR _J>. 
3 MORE THAN FOUR 
4 SECURE PLACEMENT 
0 NO PRIOR.SUPERVISION 
1 PRIOR SUPERVISION 
2 PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
3 PRIOR REVOCATION 
4 ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT 
SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
SUPERVISION RISK 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
VIOLENCE HISTORY 
(PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION 
FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE 
OF A WEAPON, PHYSICAL FORCE, 
THREAT OF FORCE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE 
WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE 
(ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICTION 
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE OR 
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS 
NOT INVOLVED) 
0 NO ESCAPES IR ABSCONDINGS 
1 FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR 
OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
2 ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
3 ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM 
4 ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 
0 NONE 
1 MISDEMEANOR 
2 3rd DEGREE FELONY 
3 2nd DEGREE FELONY 
4 1- DEGREE FELONY 
1 CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
2 ACTUAL POSSESSION 
3 DISPLAYED OR BRANDISHED 
4 ACTUAL USE 
6 INJURY CAUSED 
TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE: 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE CORRECT CATEGORY 
CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS: 40% of the shorter sentence is to be 
added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% of the shorter sentence is to be 
added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses. Capitol offenses are not considered within the 
context of the sentencing guidelines. 
ACTIVE CONVICTIONS CRIME CATEGORY TIME 
MOST SERIOUS Worker's Compensation Insurance Fraud. F2 H 
NEXT MOST SERIOUS Att. Poss. C/S w/ Intent to Dtst. F3 ! 
OTHER 
OTHER 
OFFENDER NAME: Dvan Lvnn Martinez DATE SCORED: 10-19-00 SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orqill 
OFFENDER NAME. Dvan Lynn Martinez DATE SCORED: 10-19-00 SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orqill 
CRIME CATEGORY 
V 
IV 
III 
II 
I 
A 
1st Degree 
Murder 
24 YRS 
=22 YRS 
E 
c 
O (/> 
§20YRS 
o 
^18 YRS 
5 
16 YRS 
B 
2nd Degree 
Death 
C D 
1st Degree I 3rd Degree 
Person j Death 
E 
1st Degree 
Other 
F 
2nd Degree 
Person 
8 YRS 10 YRS 48MOS 84 MOS 60MOS 
7 YRS 9 YRS 42 MOS 78 MOS 48MOS 
Imprisonment 
6 YRS 8 YRS 36MOS 72MOS 36MOS 
SYJto 7 YRS 24 MOS 
4 YRS :.;,...... 60MOS 24MOS 
G H 
3rd Degree 2nd Degree 
Person | Other 
1 
3rd Degree 
Other 
36 MOS 30 MOS 20 MO 
30MOS 24 MOS 
Intermediate 
Sanctions 
20 MOS 
Re 
AMOS Pro 
18 MOS 
•16MOSJ 
10 MO 
19MOS 1 Misde-
meanors 
Form 4 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
(Use Form 3 also for Mandatory Imprisonment Sex Offender Sentences) 
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence 
investigation where the judge can find supportive information. 
This list of aggravating and mitigating factors is non-exhaustive and illustrative only. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not an element of the offense. 
PSI Page # 
1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Multiple documented incidents of violence not resulting in conviction. (Requires court approved 
stipulation) 
3. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
4. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
5. Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
6. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
7. There were multiple charges or victims. 
8. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting. 
9. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
10. Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify as an high risk offender. 
11. Offender was in position of authority over victim(s). 
12. Other (specify) 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a defense. 
4. Offender is young. 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family relationships. 
9. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents. 
10. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
11. Offender was less active participant in the crime. 
12. All offenses were from a single criminal episode. 
13. Offender has completed or has nearly completed payment of restitution. 
14. Other (Specify) 
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
DAYS OF JAIL CREDIT 220 davs 
GUIDELINE RECOMMENDATION Probation 
AP&P RECOMMENDATIONS Probation 
REASON FOR DEPARTURE 
OFFENDER NAME: Dvan Lvnn Martinez DATE SCORED: 10-19-00 SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orgiil 
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S: Dyan returns for followup. It has been about 14 months 
since I last saw her. Unfortunately for her, she was taken 
to jail and though she states that charges were dropped, 
they kept her in jail for about one year. She just got out 
a couple of weeks ago. 
During her time, she was managed with Flexeril, Naprosyn and 
occasional Percocet. 
She presents at this time wishing to go back onto the 
long-acting narcotics. The Oxycontin was very helpful but 
as indicated earlier, that was part of the reason she was 
jailed. We started her on Methadone and she had a severe 
skin rash to that which did not clear as we had hoped with 
the steroids. 
After discussing our options, therefore, we have decided to 
go with MS Contin and we will begin at 60 mg po b.i.d. based 
on the fact that that was her Oxycontin dose. We will want 
to see her back in two weeks to assess her response and 
tolerance of the medication. 
P: At the same time, she needs to be on an anti-inflammatory. 
She has done well with Relafen in the past but with the 
development of the Cox 2 anti-inflammatories that are safer 
and less expensive, I think it is best to go with a trial of 
one of those. I have, therefore, given her samples of each 
and when she comes back in two weeks, we will assess which 
one was best and best tolerated. 
Lastly, I should say that she does attest today that she is 
taking no other medications or illicit drugs. 
ADDENDUM: I received a" call from Lorena at Workers 
Compensation. They are denying payment for her oxycontin 
stating that because of the ongoing investigations regarding 
her use of oxycontin they do not feel that it is necessary 
treatment. She does not dispute the fact that the patient 
needs treatment and that our only treatments available 
(having exhausted physical therapy surgery, injection 
therapy, etc.) is medications. She does not dispute the 
fact that short-acting narcotic medications pose a much 
greater risk for abuse but does not think that medications 
should be approved pending the ongoing litigation. The fact 
that the methadone was approved without hesitation but under 
the same circumstances does concern me. 
This patient has a suspected history of abuse of medications 
chough I am unaware of any direct proof. Of course, as 
indicated above, litigation is pending and until that time 
all allegations are, in my mind, just allegations. I feel 
that we are at greater risk for her abusing drugs if we 
withhold them than if we provide something that has a very-
low abuse potential, such as MS Contin. Certainly if she 
knows of a way to abuse the morphine and MS Contin, that 
would change my opinion but I am unaware of any at this 
point in time. 
The bottom line is that Workers Compensation will not pay 
for medications. They are okay with the pool therapy. I 
feel it my medical responsibility to provide appropriate 
treatment regardless of allegations until those allegations 
are proven. If, indeed, she has been abusing my 
prescriptions in terms of forging, selling, etc., then that 
would be a felony and I would provide no further medication 
but would agree with the recommendation for drug detox. 
JTD:dw 
Martinez, Dyan L, 
47561 
5-31-2000 Joel T. Dall, M.D. 
Dyan returns for follow-up. As I think I have indicated in my 
previous charts, narcotic medications have been disallowed for this 
lady. I have met with the FBI agent who indicates that there is 
enough evidence against her that prescribing controlled substances 
for this lady is not appropriate. This was explained to the 
patient who was very understanding. She states that she had "role 
call" yesterday and has a preliminary hearing on her drug related 
charges on the 29th of June. Until things are cleared up one way 
or the other, she understands my inability to prescribe controlled 
substances, 
She reports that the Vioxx and Celebrex were both helpful, Celebrex 
more so. Lorena has indicated that she will pay for nonnarcotic 
medications and so I have written a prescription for that today. 
Also, she is to continue with her pool therapy. 
Me will make no other changes at this time and I will see her back 
in one month, 
JTD/ga 
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PROCEEDINGS. 
THE BAILIFF: Call the Dyan Martinez case. 
THE COURT: This is the time then set for 
sentencing in the matter of State of Utah versus Dyan Lynn 
Martinez. Looked at the — this is two felony offenses, a 
second degree felony, workers compensation fraud, and a third 
degree felony, attempted possession with intent to 
distribute. 
Ms. Martinez' attorney, Mr. Dellapiana, is here 
representing the accused in this case, and Mr. Clark Harms is 
representing the State of Utah. Okay. Mr. Dellapiana. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, a couple of primary 
issues I have with the agency recommendation and one is the 
request for additional jail time or jail time at this point. 
There's several reasons I think the court should consider in 
considering our request to stay any additional jail time. The 
first is that Ms. Martinez' criminal history places her in 
the level one category, the lowest category, which indicates 
that she should be on a regular probation. 
About a week and a half ago I spoke with Ed 
McConkie, the executive director of the Utah Sentencing 
Commission came to our office for a presentation about the 
sentencing guidelines, and he was asked whether it was the 
commission's view if somebody in the regular probation 
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1 category was contemplated to be doing jail time, and his 
2 statement was that, no, they assumed that somebody in the 
3 regular probation category would be on straight street 
4 supervision. 
5 Certainly it's within the court's discretion to 
6 impose additional jail despite that but I think it's an 
7 important consideration. 
8 The second reason is that as part of the same code 
9 of conduct that resulted in the Count I in this case, the 
10 workers compensation case, she was also prosecuted for social 
11 security fraud for working under a false name during this 
12 same time. As a result of that charge Ms. Martinez was 
13 sentenced to serve 12 months in federal prison which she did 
14 complete. And that's — so she knows what punishment is 
15 about. 
16 In our view the cases, although not exactly — 
17 don't have the same exact elements are somewhat related and 
18 — and both the fact that she served a substantial amount of 
19 time and knows what punishment — that punishment follows 
20 criminal conduct and because the charges are somewhat related 
21 I think the court ought to take that into account. 
22 She did some jail time in addition, another reason 
23 — in addition to the federal time she did some jail time 
24 being held in State custody she wasn't given credit for in 
25 the federal case. It's not a lot. It was — according to her 
federal probation officer, Eric Anderson, who's present, she 
was in custody from April 1st of 1999 to April 25th of 2000. 
And that's 12 months plus 24 days. Apparently in the federal 
time they give you 12 months, you do 12 months. So it looks 
like there was maybe 24 days that she did in State custody on 
the state hold — state detainer for this case that the 
federal court's did not give her credit for. And that ought 
to be taken into account. 
Another reason that the court can probably 
consider not imposing any additional jail is that she's 
amenable — she demonstrated that she's amenable to 
supervision in her federal probation. She checks in 
regularly. She's subject to random urinalysis which have all 
been clean. She completed a mental health evaluation and 
follow-up sessions. She's paying restitution in regard to the 
social security count at the rate of a hundred dollars a 
month on a regular basis. 
THE COURT: How much was the fine for social 
security? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: $1,248 I believe is the number 
I have here. Scheduled to have those payments completed at 
the rate she's paying by April of 2001. 
Another reason that the court ought to consider 
not imposing additional jail is that she's never been on a 
supervised probation before. It's my view that prior to being 
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incarcerated a person ought to have a chance at supervised 
probation when they're — and that's of course related to the 
regular probation argument I was making based on her criminal 
history. 
Another reason, I don't know that this is one of 
the more important reasons or not but it is one of the 
mitigating factors on the — in the — in the sentencing 
guidelines and that's the effect on the family or dependents 
of Ms. Martinez. She has a 17 year old daughter who's 
pregnant. She's due to deliver in January. She's considered 
high risk because of her age and because it's her first 
pregnancy. Her father, Dyan's husband, is deceased. The 
details of that are referred to in the presentence report. 
She — Dyan drives her daughter to child birth 
classes and medical appointments and is presently buying her 
groceries and contributing to her household to the extent of 
about $300 a month. 
So those are reasons that the court ought to 
consider not imposing jail. There's some — two other areas 
that I'd like to address. One is — I'll describe as 
corrections to the presentence report and the other is 
restitution. I'm not sure if I want to go through — I 
probably should go through page by page the presentence 
report but there's two — there's two — well, let's do one 
first. 
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There's one major correction or clarification and 
these the court needs to take notice of, and that's that — 
we raised that last time we were here for sentencing. That 
has to do with the allegation that Ms. Martinez and I as her 
attorney have in some way recently been trying to commit 
fraud upon the Worker's Compensation Fund. Those allegations 
relate to a fax that I sent to Worker's Compensation Fund 
adjustor and to Dr. Dall, Workers Compensation doctor, that 
had been treating Ms. Martinez for several years now in which 
I indicated that the charges relating to distribution of 
prescription medications were dismissed. 
And for reasons which I don't know the — the — 
maybe it was because merely — the mere reliance on the 
docket of the court doesn't — didn't provide enough clear 
indication to a non-attorney, somebody who's not used to 
dealing with those on a regular basis to where they could 
understand that that's what happened. Certainly the Court's 
the court's information is clear in that regard, the 
amended information we pled to in the plea form, and because 
of that it's — I mean it's obvious that those assertions are 
simply untrue in regard to Ms. Martinez and I. 
THE COURT: How much do you believe restitution 
is then, Mr. Dellapiana. 14,647? 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, I'll address that when I 
talk about restitution. There were a number of questions you 
7 
asked last week I have the answers to. 
THE COURT: Okay. Great. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Would you like me to address my 
(inaudible) on restitution first? 
THE COURT: Let's let Mr. Harms and if you 
disagree with that — (inaudible). 
MR. HARMS: Your Honor, let me just limit my 
comments right now to the restitution. 
THE COURT: Okay. Great. 
MR. HARMS: I spoke to Brent McDonald the 
workers compensation fund and apparently up until 1995 the 
law of the State of Utah was that once someone was determined 
by the Industrial Commission to have been permanently fully 
disabled that decision is irrevocable and cannot be reviewed. 
In 1995 a person went to request petitions of the workers 
compensation fund. The legislature changed that law. 
Ms. Martinez was declared permanently, totally 
disabled prior to 1995, prior to the date of the legislation. 
Consequently the State of Utah is bound by the law as it was 
in place at the time of her award and determination of 
eligibility. The State of Utah is prevented from any 
reconsideration of that eligibility and is prevented from any 
reconsideration of that award. 
Consequently, despite the fact that she was 
working Workers Compensation Fund would have had to pay for 
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pain medicine. Had they known what they know they would have 
prescribed a different prescription and the $14,377.56 is the 
rate of difference between what she was prescribed and what 
they would have prescribed had they known the true facts. The 
law would have required them to prescribe, however, some form 
of medication. 
THE COURT: Even though she was working? 
MR. HARMS: Correct. 
THE COURT: And what is it that they did not 
know? That she was — that the prescription Oxycontin was 
being distributed to Sundowners? 
MR. HARMS: They didn't know that. They didn't 
know — specifically they didn't know how many pills she was 
obtaining compared to how many she was prescribed. That 
amount and that specific fact would have caused them to 
prescribe something else because of the very notion of the 
discrepancy. 
If I can approach, Your Honor, it's — this is the 
same chart we've used throughout this prosecution. 
Those are the prescriptions each — the shaded 
area is the number of pills obtained. The bold line that goes 
horizontally across the bottom quarter of that page at the — 
about the 200 level, 180 level, that's the actual 
prescription that she had authority to obtain and the rest of 
the shaded area above that is the number of pills she 
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1 actually obtained. 
2 Given that fact they would have prescribed her 
3 something that was nonaddictive without really going into 
4 whether not or not she was addicted 02: not, without going 
5 into whether or not she was giving the pills to somebody else 
6 or not, that fact alone would have caused them to prescribe a 
7 lesser alternative medication as opposed to the Oxycontin. 
8 THE COURT: Well, I'm just a little bit troubled 
9 with the substituting one prescription for another. It seems 
10 to me based on what you told me about her irrevocable 
11 entitlement to prescription reimbursement payment through 
12 workers compensation that her doctors prescribed 246 10 
13 milligram pills. Through artifice, scheme and defraud she 
14 obtained 450. Why isn't the restitution between the 246 and 
15 450? 
16 MR. HARMS: I think because workers compensation 
17 looked at this as a case where they still would have been 
18 prescribing something. They would not have prescribed 
19 Oxycontin as the (inaudible) of abuse of that specific drug. 
20 Consequently they would have prescribed this other drug. 
21 That's just how they looked at it. So that's where that 
22 number of restitution comes from. The rest of the 
23 restitution, the difference between the 17690 and the 14377 
24 are investigative costs, administrative costs, clerical and 
25 copying costs involved in the investigation by workers comp 
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which I think are appropriate given her specific conviction 
of workers compensation fraud. 
THE COURT: What was your clients conduct that 
allowed the tablets to go from the 246 to 450? Was it a 
simple change in prescription or what was it? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Change in her prescription 
based on her thirty day reviews and consultations with the 
doctor who after discussing with her her course of treatment 
prescribed the medications that she received. 
THE COURT: What did she do just make a pen and 
ink change to the prescription? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: She didn't forge anything. She 
didn't change anything. 
THE COURT: What did she do? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: These are our — judge our 
position is that all the medications she was prescribed were 
prescribed by the doctor after consultation. The entry of her 
plea was that she was — 
THE COURT: What's the artifice, scheme and 
fraud to then obtain these pills. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, the state is presenting 
the charge in relation to the workers compensation fraud as 
— as a fraud to obtain medications. The — that's not what 
Ms. Martinez admitted in her plea. She — she indicated that 
she had misrepresented to the Workers Compensation Fund that 
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1 she was not employed when in fact she was employed using a 
2 false name and receiving employment payments and salary at 
3 the same time she was receiving Workers Compensation payments 
4 due to — alleging or based on the prior determination that 
5 she was unable to work. She denies falsely obtaining 
6 medications. 
7 THE COURT: She used the assumed name? 
8 MR. DELLAPIANA: Not for medications. 
9 THE COURT: What was the assumed name for? 
10 MR. DELLAPIANA: To — 
11 THE COURT: To what? 
12 MR. DELLAPIANA: To work under a — to work and 
13 receive — make money at the same time she was — 
14 THE COURT: You work. You don't use an assumed 
15 name. Why do you have to use soft language to couch criminal 
16 conduct? She's working off social security. What's she 
17 doing? Why use an assumed name? 
18 MS. MARTINEZ: When I was working? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
2 0 MS. MARTINEZ: So that I --
21 THE COURT: I'll play the stupid one. Okay, how 
22 did the Oxycontin enter the Sundowners? 
23 MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge there were two 
24 bottles — 
25 THE COURT: What — how did — I understand 
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that. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: She spent time with the 
Sundowners including in the — 
THE COURT: It's hard for me to say this. She 
obtained this prescription she wasn't using, distributed it 
through her husband to her former husband to the Sundowners, 
is that right? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: That is not right. 
THE COURT: Okay. How did it get there then? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: She --
MS. MARTINEZ: I left the bottle there. 
THE COURT: You what? 
MS. MARTINEZ: When they arrested us I had my 
prescription on me. And there was another bottle, an older 
bottle that was empty that was in the club house that I left 
there previously. And there was nothing illegal going on. I 
mean, my husband was a member and I spent time down there. He 
was a bar manager so we spent time down there. 
THE COURT: Okay. What else do you have then? 
What did you want to state say your bottom line figure, Mr. 
Dellapiana? What do you believe is the restitution? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I want to hear the state's 
figure if I could. 
THE COURT: They're with the — the State's 
taking the position that the restitution is $17,690 dollars, 
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is that right? 
MR. HARMS: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: All right, Judge. We're 
opposed to imposition of any restitution. Let me state my 
reasons. First, at least any of the proposed restitution. 
First, the — the salary, the overhead 
investigation costs while I haven't seen any case law on 
point I'm going to object to as being general overhead costs 
that don't — that don't produce any marginal additional cost 
to the Workers Compensation fund. These are salaried 
employees. They get paid either way. And that's — the total 
of that is $2,982 dollars involving investigation and 
surveillance expenses. We're opposed to any order relating to 
that amount. 
In relation to the $14,377 that's described as 
relating to the Oxycontin, first I'd note that charges 
relating to the distribution of Oxycontin were dismissed. I 
don't think restitution is therefore appropriate. 
Second, the — using that figure assumes that 
she's not eligible for benefits for the payment of her 
medications. As even the state has admitted she's guaranteed 
to be eligible for medical benefits by state law and by the 
terms of her settlement agreement. So imposing that figure 
assumes that she was never eligible for benefits. 
Now, the reason that she is eligible for benefits 
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is because they've been determined to be medically 
appropriate. The — in this — there's two different points 
in this. One, the formula of comparing Oxycontin to methadone 
is based on the false premise that methadone would have 
been — 
THE COURT: Mr. Dellapiana, we're going to have 
to step this up a little. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Want me to go faster? 
THE COURT: Boy that would be great. Yeah, I've 
got a huge calendar to do (inaudible) and we could have tried 
this case quicker than I'm trying to sentence. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I doubt it, judge. 
THE COURT: I've got to tell you, to describe 
Ms. Martinez as sanction resistant would be a monumental 
understatement. Let's focus just for a moment, there is some 
deceit in all this that apparently Ms. Martinez wants to 
acknowledge out of one side of her mouth but then not out of 
the other. 
The basis, frankly, for the restitution, Mr. 
Dellapiana, is the statement of Dr. Dall who is, after all, 
the person who writes the prescription, that had he known 
that the defendant was gainfully employed under an alias or 
was receiving an average of 360 Oxycontin pills per month he 
would not have prescribed Oxycontin for the defendant. 
Now it seems to me to be fairly elementary that 
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while she has a statutory right to have payment by workers 
compensation funds for prescription benefits that does not 
ipso facto mean she has the right to be deceitful, to provide 
false information, to obtain medicine that she otherwise 
would not have obtained had she not engaged in her fraudulent 
misrepresentative activity. 
So, the legal basis for the restitution is that 
she should not have, would not have received Oxycontin at all 
had she been forthright and had she been not engaging in her 
fraudulent activities. The doctor tells me through the 
(inaudible) investigator that he would not have made the 
prescription at all. It is awfully disingenuous at this 
point for her now to stand on the not withstanding the fact 
that I'm deceitful and dishonest pay for it anyway. That's 
not going to happen. 
So you might be able to have the Court of Appeals 
do that but I'm not going to do the overhead expense. This is 
not on her time. I just want the dollar figure for her. The 
out of pocket cost to workers compensation fund. 
I've got to tell you this is so clear to me that 
that's the right thing to do. There is a factual basis for 
that. The doctor said he would not have prescribed the 
medication had he known all the circumstances. She hid it. 
The person who's being disingenuous and dishonest doesn't get 
now to ram it all down our throats. Okay? 
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay, judge, but I need to 
state for the record a couple of details. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Including statements from Dr. 
Dall. One of them is about methadone. The state is 
calculating this number based on the assumption of methadone 
which is a very low cost drug would have been prescribed. 
And in the presentence report the presentence investigator 
assumes that when Ms. Martinez said that she couldn't use 
methadone that she was lying to him. And the only reason she 
said that is because methadone has a lower street value and 
she wanted to get something more expensive. 
Here's what Dr. Joel Dall says. This is in a note 
that's attached to the Workers Compensation Fund letter dated 
May the 16th of this year wherein he says we started her on 
methadone. She had a severe skin rash. 
THE COURT: Let's not offset the methadone. 
Let's just have her pay for the medication she never should 
have obtained but for her lying, conniving, cheating 
conduct. If you don't want to have an offset for what it 
would have cost for methadone that's fine with me. 
Doctor Dall says he never would have given the 
prescription had he known the truth. Okay. So let's just 
find out what was the dollar figure that Workers Compensation 
paid for the Oxycontin. And I'm told that that is — isn't 
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that the 14,000 dollar figure? I was wanting to deduct what 
they would have been willing to prescribe. You told me not 
to do that, so that's okay. Let's not do that. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: The state can give you a 
figure. I need to make a record and I'm not finished. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just tell you again I'm 
not going to have the sentence include not her paying back 
that which was essentially stolen. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: The first two times. 
THE COURT: Right. And she stole the 
prescription by misrepresenting her status. I'm willing to 
offset that — offset what the state would have paid had they 
known the truth. If it's a different drug than the one that 
was given, that's okay. So it's 14,647. Isn't that what Dr. 
Dall's telling me he never would have prescribed had he known 
the truth? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think even the state will say 
that that's not the number. 
THE COURT: Okay. The presentence report tells 
me (inaudible) 14,607 was for a single prescription drug 
Oxycontin (inaudible). 
MR. DELLAPIANA: All right. Can I continue for a 
minute? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And, Judge, I know I'm here 
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every Monday, I know it's a long calendar but this is kind 
of an important issue and I don't have much more to add, 
but --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think I need to. 
These are the reasons — continue on the reasons 
why restitution is not appropriate. At least not in the 
amount that they're suggesting. Our position is Oxycontin was 
the prescribed medication by the doctor based on his analysis 
of Ms. Martinez' needs. Again quoting from his letter that's 
attached to the document submitted by the Workers 
Compensation Fund in which referring — responding to the 
Workers Compensation Fund adjuster's indication that they're 
trying to deny payment for the Oxycontin. 
He says it's because they do not — they do not 
feel that it is necessary treatment but, quote, she does not 
dispute — this is Larana, the Workers Compensation Fund 
adjuster. She does not dispute the fact that the patient 
needs treatment and that our only treatments available having 
exhausted physical therapy, surgery, four failed back 
surgeries, injection therapy, et cetera, is medications. 
And so, this is a doctor's view of based on his 
medical expertise that Ms. Martinez needs medication. 
THE COURT: Too bad she wasn't honest enough to 
the get the best prescription medication he could have given, 
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don't you think? Are you disputing he's telling me through 
AP&P he would not have prescribed the Oxycontin had he known 
the truth? 
MR, DELLAPIANA: Judge, the way I read that is 
that in 20/20, or in hindsight at least he's saying, gee, 
that's a lot of Oxycontin. Maybe I was prescribing too much. 
Certainly doesn't deny prescribing it and he's not 
saying he would not have prescribed it. He certainly was 
prescribing it based on his monthly meetings with Ms. 
Martinez. 
The final issue, Judge, is in relation to the 
statute that requires the court take into consideration Ms. 
Martinez' ability to pay in determining whether or not 
restitution is appropriate at all, or whether it should be 
complete or partial or nominal. Her financial resources are 
described in the presentence report. She was — she's on 
permanent disability monthly payments. She has — she 
contributes to the care of her pregnant daughter. She is 
paying restitution for the federal case. And has — 
THE COURT: She's paying a hundred dollars a 
month, is that right? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: She — her payments are a 
hundred dollars a month. 
THE COURT: And when will that end? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: April. 
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THE COURT: April. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: April of 2001. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And she has — I'm not sure 
how much but it's extremely limited funds. $1,040 a month she 
receives from Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. And has 
monthly expenses for of course utilities, food, rent, 
restitution I already mentioned, and what she contributes. 
THE COURT: I read that. That's in the 
presentence report, isn't it? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: It is. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: And that's — that's all I 
have to say about restitution, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Harms. 
MR. HARMS: I ask you to follow the 
recommendations of the presentence report, Your Honor. The 
reason I feel jail's appropriate, this was a continuing 
course of conduct by which Ms. Martinez defrauded the state. 
While she may have been entitled to certain benefits had she 
been honest with the Workers Compensation Fund those benefits 
would have been reduced because she would have been employed. 
Second of all, she obtained significant quantities 
of a schedule two narcotic while she was working. If she was 
in such pain that she needed that narcotic she wouldn't have 
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been able to work and virtually she's able to work she 
shouldn't have used that much narcotic. 
With regard to the other reason I think jail 
time's appropriate despite the fact that through discovery 
Ms. Martinez was aware of everything in this presentence 
report including the level of Oxycontin previously obtained 
by her and the fact that Dr. Dall said he wouldn't have 
prescribed that had he known she was working, she has since 
pleading continued to try to obtain Oxycontin (inaudible). 
I think that her course of conduct shows no 
remorse and in fact (inaudible). I'd ask for the 120 days in 
jail. 
With regard to the restitution, Your Honor, the 
total amount paid by Workers Compensation Fund during the 
time period when she was gainfully employed for Oxycontin 
alone is $16,152.41. The 14,000 dollar figure is the offset. 
The actual amount of Oxycontin again is $16,152.41. 
With regard to terms and conditions of probation, 
Your Honor, in addition to those specified in the AP&P 
presentence report it's my request that she be prohibited 
from any contact with any members of the Sundowners 
organization or their associates or anyone (inaudible) state 
or federal prosecution, a list to be provided to her 
probation officer. That she be prohibited from obtaining any 
prescription medication from any doctor without an express 
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written prior approval of her probation officer, and that she 
be prohibited while on probation from obtaining prescriptions 
for Oxycontin, that she be prohibited from approaching Dr. 
Dall who clearly is not without fault in this matter and can 
not use Dr. Dall for (inaudible) during the time of 
probation. 
There's a significant list of other doctor's who 
are well qualified. I don't think we need to revisit this 
issue. 
Finally, Your Honor, it would be my request that 
the court order restitution be paid in the amount of $400 a 
month. She will be entitled to continue to receive her 
thousand dollars from Workers Compensation Fund through the 
State of Utah. That money will not be prohibited from coming 
to her by this conviction. However, out of one side of her 
mouth she says don't send me to jail. I can't be punished 
because my daughter is pregnant and I need to contribute to 
her financial benefit. 
On the other hand she says I'm too poor to pay for 
restitution. I think the court can see through that and 
impose the restitution amount that is fair. She's currently 
married. She has money coming in from that source. I think 
this has to be paid and the restitution (inaudible) while on 
probation. $300 a month will allow that to happen. 
Finally, Your Honor, I'm somewhat offended that 
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the defense in this case has sought to seek advisory opinions 
regarding sentencing from those outside of the realm of the 
courtroom. Mr. McConkie wants to be judge and (inaudible). 
I'd ask the court to impose sentence. 
THE COURT: Just so I understand your figures 
Mr. Harms, the difference between the Oxycontin and some 
other prescription whether it's methadone or whatever she 
might have used had the deceit not been involved you said 
14,000, but then you jump that up to 17,000. Is there any 
overhead expense? 
MR. HARMS: No, Your Honor. What I did is added 
through my discovery — while Mr. Dellapiana was speaking I 
went through and added all the prescriptions filled by Dr. 
Dall during this time period, only the time period she was 
working, for schedule two narcotics. Those amounts equal a 
total of 16,152.41. 
The 14,377 figure in the presentence report is the 
offset for not prescribing Oxycontin but prescribing 
methadone. It gets to the 17 thousand through investigation 
costs incurred by the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Let me say this about the 
restitution. There are on occasion times that there is — 
restitution often becomes recoupment in that there are 
restitution investigation prosecution costs, whether there's 
court ordered exams or whatever it is. It seems to me that 
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the issue of Ms. Martinez' lack of ability to pay that really 
mutes that out. I'm not going to order any investigative or 
overhead costs in this case. I think there are clearly cases 
where that is appropriate. This is not one of them. 
Indeed it is — given her disability and limited 
income I think at this point we're really talking about 
theoretical amounts. In any event this is a civil standard 
in terms of amounts of restitution, not a criminal standard. 
I think it's clear to me that the state to a civil standard 
has shown their entitlement to be approximately $16,000 but 
given her disability and lack of ability to pay during the 
period of probation I'm going to order a portion of that as 
part of sentence in this case. 
Before I pronounce sentence, Mr. Dellapiana, one 
final question regarding the suggestion of the state 
regarding no contact orders. I presume that you're familiar 
with the names that are on the list that he'll provide me. 
Do you have any objection to any of that? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, just as an extensive 
potential list are these friends? 
(Whereupon, a short discussion was held off the 
record.) 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Her husband and her son. 
THE COURT: They belong to the Sundowners? 
MS. MARTINEZ: Not my son, no. My husband does. 
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My deceased husband and my husband both are members, 
MR. HARMS: It would not be our position that 
there's no contact (inaudible) relatives. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dellapiana, any legal 
reason why sentence should not be imposed? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Not that I'm aware of, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. It will be the judgment of the 
court in this matter that on each of these two felony 
matters, the second degree felony and the third degree 
felony, Ms. Martinez, that you be ordered committed to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law on the second degree felony of not less than one or more 
than 15 years. On the third degree felony for not more than 
five years. 
I'm ordering that the prison sentences run 
consecutive to each other. However, at this time I will stay 
the execution of the prison sentences and place you on 
supervised probation to Adult Probation and Parole. And Mr. 
Dellapiana and Mr. Harms I'm going to order a two year not a 
three year probation on each of the two felony counts, but 
order that probationary periods run consecutive to each other 
so that the total period of probation for Ms. Martinez is a 
48 month period of time. 
As a condition of probation I'm ordering that she 
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pay the sum of $100 per month as and for restitution for the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah commencing with the month 
of April of 2001 and continue throughout the period of your 
probation with Adult Probation and Parole. 
I'm also ordering as a condition of probation that 
you serve 60 days in the Salt Lake County jail. I'll order 
your forthwith commitment for that. And you're further 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $400 inclusive, not 
exclusive, of the restitution, together with the 100 dollar 
attorney fee recoupment and that is to be paid with the 
restitution figures through Adult Probation and Parole. 
You are to abide by all of the terms and 
conditions of supervised probation including no association 
with members of the Sundowners Club other than your husband, 
of course, or immediate family member. You are not to use any 
alcoholic beverage, illicit drugs while on probation and Ms. 
Martinez you are to have written approval of and disclosure 
of any prescription medication that you may take. That would 
need to be disclosed to and approved by your probation 
officer. 
You'll need to submit your person, place of 
residence, any property in your control to a reasonable 
search by a probation officer, submit to random drug testing 
as requested by your probation officer. You are to obtain a 
substance evaluation administered under the direction of AP&P 
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and comply with any and all treatment measures recommended by 
Adult Probation and Parole. 
The State of Utah will prepare and present to your 
probation officer and Mr. Dellapiana a list of persons with 
whom you are to have no contact and I'll be happy to review 
that if necessary. Happy is an over statement. Willing to 
review that, Mr. Dellapiana. 
Obviously, Ms. Martinez, I'm not — would not 
allow AP&P to impinge upon bona fide family relations and 
those kind of things. 
I wonder if at some point, you know, the 
Sundowners activity, the — all the stuff that's brought 
enough heartache to your life, I wonder why it is that you 
hang on to that. I ask that rhetorically and would just say 
to you that while you're on probation not only do you have to 
be in compliance with the law, but frankly the element of 
perception, and you're not to associate with people who are 
using drugs, the place where drugs are being used, and 
euphemistically lets call that the club house as if that has 
not historically been and if it is not a place of criminal 
activity. 
It's not a good thing for a person on probation to 
take that kind of position. I think it's way past time that 
you be mature and appropriate in all of your activities in 
your life particularly now while you're on a supervised 
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probation. 
I have a little concern with invading your 
doctor/patient relationship with Dr. Dall. I would just add 
editorially that I'm not so sure that was a marriage made in 
heaven either, and if I had a medical practitioner that was 
so cavalier in how he or she was prescribing medication I may 
want to be involved with someone who was a little — was way 
more careful with my own health related issues. 
Those are choices that you can make and I think at 
this point it would be improper for me to or not necessary 
for me to say that, but I will say this. If you decide to 
deal with Dr. Dall and you know your medical (inaudible) 
that's okay. But let me underscore for you that taking any 
prescribed medication without first having that disclosed by 
and to Adult Probation and Parole, any kind of end run to try 
to compel Workmen's Compensation Fund to pay for medication 
because you requested can provide the information thatf s 
going to violate your probation. 
It would just seem to me that you ought to just 
close the chapter in this — close this unfortunate chapter. 
I would personally not touch Oxy — whatever that is, if it 
were free. And given the history that's had with you — and 
I would not deal with Dr. Dall. I would — there are 
certainly other better ways that you can receive pain 
medication that is right, is less harmful, is not going to 
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1 look bad, is not going to be in any way linked to drug usage 
2 by the Sundowners Club House. 
3 Does that make sense at all to you? Again, I'm 
4 not enjoining you from — you can do whatever, get whatever 
5 medical help you believe is in your best interest. Just 
6 comply with probation at the same time. To the degree you 
7 use Dr. Dall, to the degree that you (inaudible) these old 
8 issues I think you're just inviting problems in your 
9 probation. 
10 Any questions you have, Ms. Martinez, or Mr. 
11 Dellapiana? Okay. Order your forthwith commitment. 
12 Mr. Harms, let me give this back to you. Thank 
13 you, sir. Thank you. Nice job. 
14 (Whereupon, court was held in recess at 10:11.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PAMELA C. SMITH, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Merit Reporter and Notary Public within and for 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That I was NOT present at the foregoing court 
proceedings;. 
That the foregoing record was preserved by 
videotape;. 
That thereafter, I stenographically recorded the 
requested portion of the video and translated the same using 
computer-aided transcription, followed by a proofreading 
against the video. 
That the foregoing pages contain to the best of my 
ability a full, true and correct transcript of the same. 
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this -j day of -^  ^  ,,,^i ^  , 2001. 
PAMELA C. SMITH, C.S.R.,R.P.R. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
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